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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report, the “Diaz Team” 
identified CAIB Report elements with Agency-wide applicability.   The “Diaz Report”, A 
Renewed Commitment To Excellence, generated an action to “Review current policies 
and waivers on safety factors”.  This white paper addresses this action. 
 
Four different projects from four different centers were audited on their definition, 
requirements, and use of structural ultimate Factor of Safety (FOSult): Orbiter managed at 
JSC, External Tank managed at MSFC, X-43 managed at DFRC, and the Swift spacecraft 
managed at GSFC. 
 
The projects were asked to provide the document that defines their FOSult requirements, 
provide the FOSult requirement, provide the project’s definition of the FOSult, and provide 
a list of any waivers to the FOSult requirement.   
 
All of the projects audited utilize NASA-STD-5001 for the overall structure FOSult 
requirements but ultimately customized the NASA-STD-5001 requirement(s) into their 
own internal requirements document.   
 
The vast majority of the projects met NASA-STD-5001 structural FOSult value of 1.4.  As 
expected, there were exceptions when a waiver was granted or the requirement relaxed 
for a particular piece of hardware.  Although a technical justification was provided to the 
waiver/relaxation, the audit found the technical justification was necessary, but not 
sufficient. 
 
The audit has made the following five recommendations.  These are discussed in more 
detail in Section 6 of this paper. 
 
1. FOSult for no-test hardware:  Perform study to determine if higher FOSult values 
are required for no-test hardware and update NASA-STD-5001 to include specific 
guidance and suggested no-test FOS requirements.   
 
2. Requirement Relaxation:  Reduction of the standard FOSult value should be 
documented via a waiver or deviation as opposed to a relaxation of the 
requirement.   
 
3. FOSult Waivers should not be used as a Precedent: For reusable or recurring 
flight hardware, a waiver should be considered a one time exception and not a 
precedent. 
 
4. Maintaining FOSult Over the Life of a Program: Due to aging effects, the 
Margin of Safety (MOSult) and FOSult should be periodically reevaluated. 
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5. Probabilistic Approaches (PA):  Conduct a study to determine if Probabilistic 
Approaches can be used as an alternate method to traditional FOS methods.   PA 
may exhibit excellent promise in reducing the FOS requirements while 
maintaining the overall reliability of the system. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
 
The CAIB provided the following Observation:  
 
O10.10-1 NASA should reinstate a safety factor of 1.4 for the Attachment Rings, 
which invalidates the use of ring serial numbers 16 and 15 in their 
present state, and replace all deficient material in the Attachment Rings. 
 
Background 
The External Tank Attach (ETA) rings are located on the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) 
on the forward end of the aft motor segment (Figure 2-1). The rings provide the aft attach 
points for the SRBs to the External Tank (ET).   Tensile tests of ETA ring web material 
found the ETA ring material strengths were lower than the design requirement. The ring 
material was from a previously flown and subsequently scrapped ETA ring which is 
representative of current flight inventory material.  
 
 
Figure 2-1.  SRB External Tank Attach Rings  
 
 
Following the CAIB Report, the NASA Administrator assigned an Executive Team to 
identify CAIB Report elements with Agency-wide applicability.   This team became 
known as the “Diaz Team” and its Report, A Renewed Commitment To Excellence, as the 
“Diaz Report”.   
 
Based on the above CAIB observation, the Diaz Report found “design and safety factors 
have been developed by many engineering and manufacturing organizations with a broad 
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base of underlying test and supporting data” and the Office of Chief Engineer assigned 
the following specific action to NESC – Action Item 16: 
 
 
 
16) Review current policies and waivers on safety factors. 
a. Conduct an audit of no less than three programs. Determine if the 
programs are using a 1.4 safety factor, and what waivers have been 
granted. 
b. Compile the results and develop a recommendation. 
c. If required, develop or rewrite a policy for minimum safety factors, and 
associated waivers. 
 
The purpose of this white paper is to document the response(s) to the above action item. 
The paper is organized in the following order.   
 
- An overview is presented of the FOS.   
- Review of the structural FOS standards used at several of the NASA Field 
Centers.   
- Survey of FOSult used by four programs at various centers and the results of 
the audit of these FOSult are presented.    
- Discussion of waivers used by various programs and followed by the 
recommendations. 
 
This report utilizes the definitions for various terms presented in Section 3 of the NASA-
STD-5001 [1].  Relevant definitions used in this document are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
4 
3. FACTORS OF SAFETY (FOS) 
 
3.1. General 
 
To account for uncertainties and unknowns, including material variations, analysis 
uncertainties, etc., a structural member must be designed to carry a load considerably 
larger than the maximum expected applied load.  To determine the appropriate design 
load, the maximum expected applied load is multiplied by a FOS.  In the 1930’s there 
was ambiguity among the definitions used for design load, expected load and applied 
loads.  Therefore, the U.S. Army Air Corps established the following definitions 
summarized in Table 3-1 which are used today in the Aerospace industry. 
 
Table 3-1.  Terminology Definitions 
Term Definition 
Limit Load Maximum expected load on the structure. 
Ultimate Load1 Product of the Limit Load times the Ultimate 
Factor of Safety (FOSult).  This is the load for 
which a structure is designed for ultimate strength 
and must be less than the Allowable Ultimate 
Load. 
Yield Load Product of the Limit Load times the Yield Factor 
of Safety (FOSyield).  This is a load for which a 
structure is designed for yield strength and must be 
less than the Allowable Yield Load. 
Allowable Ultimate Load The highest load that will not cause material 
failure. 
Allowable Yield Load The highest load that will not cause material 
plastic deformation. 
Note 1) Ultimate Load is also often referred to as “Ultimate Design Load” or “Design Ultimate 
Load”. 
 
Therefore the Factor of Safety is defined as: 
 
 LoadLimit 
Load Ultimate  FOSult =  
 
 LoadLimit 
Load Yield  FOSyield =  
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The Aerospace industry also uses an additional term called the Margin of Safety (MOS).  
The MOS relates the design load to the allowable load. 
 
1
LoadUltimate
Load  UltimateAllowable  MOSult −=  
 
             1
FOSLoadLimit 
Load  UltimateAllowable 
ult
−⋅=  
and  
 
1
LoadYield
Load Yield Allowable  MOSyield −=  
 
               1
FOSLoadLimit 
Load Yield Allowable 
yield
−⋅=  
 
When the MOSult equals zero, the Allowable Ultimate Load, or capability, equals 
Ultimate Load, the load for which the structure was designed.    
 
Figure 3-1 schematically presents the loads defined above and the relationship between 
FOSult and MOSult.  The load is plotted against the stress of a linear elastic structure.  This 
is an idealized figure for illustration purposes only.    
 
Load
S
tre
ss
Mean Static
Ultimate Strength
Knock-downs
(notches, etc.)
MOSult
FOSult
Limit Load
(Max Operational Load)
Ultimate Load
(Design Load)
Allowable
Ultimate Load
(Effective Material Capability)
S
tre
ss
 
Figure 3-1.  Graphical Illustration of Relationship between FOS and MOS. 
6 
 
 
3.1.1. Alternate Definitions 
Some additional discussion on the definition of FOS and MOS is pertinent here.  
The definitions above are used widely throughout the Aerospace industry 
including NASA.  Recall that the Ultimate Load is the product of the Limit Load 
and FOSult, and according to this definition the Ultimate Load has no relationship 
to the material Allowable Ultimate Load.  However, the MOSult relates the 
Ultimate Load to the Allowable Ultimate Load.  
 
In numerous non-aerospace fields, as well as many classical mechanical 
engineering text books, the concept of a separate design load is not used and the 
FOS is simply defined as: 
 
LoadLimit 
Load  UltimateAllowable  FOSult =  
 
and MOS is defined as: 
 
1-FOS  MOS ultult = . 
 
Additionally, since the relationship between load and stress is often linear, many 
engineering texts will define the FOS and MOS with respect to stress as opposed 
to loads.   
 
The above definitions are different than those used throughout NASA. 
Throughout this white paper, therefore, the definitions in Section 3.1 apply. 
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3.2. Basis of Factor of Safety 
The FOS utilized in aerospace design is intended to cover various uncertainties in the 
way the structure is analyzed.  The magnitude of the factor is dependent upon how 
accurately the structure is understood and modeled, material property understanding, and 
manufacturing control processes.  The factor is based on engineering judgment and 
experience. 
 
The determination of this factor must consider the following: 
• Types of loads 
o Static or dynamic 
o Cyclic loading 
• Processing and fabrication defects (variability on workmanship quality) 
• Variations in material properties 
• Accuracy and methods of analysis 
o Limitations of modeling methods/techniques (e.g. two-dimensional, 
shell, three-dimensional, etc.) 
o Limitations of analysis methods (e.g.. finite element method, boundary 
element method, etc.) 
o Inadequate knowledge of factors such as boundary conditions, residual 
stresses, etc. 
o Limitation of analysis types (e.g. linear elastic, elastic-plastic, 
dynamics, etc.) 
• Failure mode criticality 
o Catastrophic 
o Non-catastrophic 
o Redundancy  
• Levels of test verification  
o Test vs. No test 
o Component vs. System 
• Manned vs. Unmanned Mission 
 
The FOS is applicable for the life of the system and, therefore, must address any material 
property degradation during service.   
 
The FOS is not designed to account for uncertainty of external loads, major variation in 
material properties (poor material manufacturing process control, material defects such as 
flaws, cracks, voids, etc.), or poor/limited understanding of failure modes. 
 
In 1932 there was evidence that components of successfully designed airplanes did not 
yield, that is, permanently deform.   Since the common structural material at that time 
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was 17ST aluminum alloy having an ultimate-to-yield stress ratio of 1.5, the arbitrary 1.5 
safety factor at ultimate was universally accepted.  Since this factor is determined from 
historical experience rather than physics-based methodologies, there is a tendency to 
challenge its value and application.   
 
3.3.  FOSult for Airframes 
The FOSult for airframes is defined as in Section 3.1, the ratio of ultimate load to the limit 
load. The limit load is the highest load experienced by the structural component in the life 
of the aircraft fleet.  The FOSult conventionally used for commercial transport aircraft 
airframes remains at 1.5.  
 
3.4. FOSult for Aerospace Structures 
Based on improved aluminum alloys, and involving historically-driven programmatic 
requirements for optimized performance, a 1.4 design ultimate safety factor is now the 
official NASA standard as defined in NASA-STD-5001 for metallic structures 
(Protoflight Approach [1]). This commonly utilized aerospace structural FOS is 
considered applicable for a system with well characterized materials, well understood 
load paths, and manufactured to aerospace standard processes.   Note that for non-
metallic materials, such as composites, a higher ultimate factor of safety is used (see 
NASA-STD-5001). 
 
The NASA–STD-5001 [1] establishes recommended practice of standard structural 
design and test factors for space flight hardware development and verification.  In 
addition, NASA-STD-5005 [2] provides design criteria for ground support equipment 
while STD–5003 [3] and STD-5007 [4] provide fracture control requirements for 
payloads using the space shuttle and manned space flight systems, respectively. 
 
A historical perspective of the design FOS used throughout major NASA missions is 
summarized in Table 3.2.  
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HISTORIC DESIGN FACTORS 
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4. CURRENT FACTOR OF SAFETY STANDARDS 
 
4.1. NASA FOS Standards 
Many of the field centers developed customized standards to address applications not 
included in NASA-STD-5001, as presented in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-1. Structural FOS Standards used at the NASA Field Centers 
NASA Field Center Commonly used Standards1 
Dryden Flight Center DHB-R-001 Dryden Flight Research Center Hand Book For Structural 
Design, Proof Test, and Flight Test Envelope Guidelines [5] 
Glenn Research Center NASA-STD-5001 Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for 
Spaceflight Hardware [1] 
Goddard Space Flight Center GSFC-GEVS-SE General Environmental Verification Specification [6] 
Johnson Space Center 
Space Shuttle Program (SSP) 
 
 
 
Space Shuttle Payloads 
 
 
 
 
International Space Station 
 
 
NSTS 07700 Vol X Space Shuttle Flight and Ground System 
Specification, and the Shuttle Interface Control Documents (ICD's) [7] 
 
NSTS 1700.7B Safety and Policy Requirements for Payload using STS[8] 
 
NSTS 14046D Payload Verification Requirements 
 
SSP 30559 Structural Design and Verification Requirements 
 
Langley Research Center NASA-STD-5001 Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for 
Spaceflight Hardware [1] 
 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
 
 
 
 
 
Space Shuttle Elements 
 
 
General 
 
NASA-STD-5001 Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for 
Spaceflight Hardware [1] 
 
MSFC-HDBK-505A Structural Strength Design and Verification 
Requirements [9] 
 
NSTS 07700 Vol X Flight and Ground System Specification - Book 1, 
Requirements [7] 
 
ED22-OWI-001 MSFC Organizational Work  Instruction, Strength 
Analysis [10] 
Stennis Space Center ASME Boiler Standards 
Note: 
1) This Table is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of all of the Standards used at the NASA Field centers, 
but as an indication of the various documents used. 
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4.2. Non-NASA Standards 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires an aircraft structural FOSult of 1.5.  
Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) requires an FOSult of 1.5 for aircraft and 1.4 
for aerospace structures [11].   Table 4-2 below lists FOSult and standards used by non-
NASA organizations. 
 
Table 4-2. FOS Standards used by non-NASA Organizations 
Organization Standard FOSult
FAA 
• Transport Aircraft 
• Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, 
Commuter Aircraft 
 
Federal Aviation Regulation Part 25 Sec 25.303 
Federal Aviation Regulation Part 23 Sec 23.303 
 
 
1.5 
1.5 
DoD 
• Aircraft Structures 
• Aluminum Aerospace Structures  
 
MIL-A-8860B 
MIL-HDBK-340A/ MIL-HDBK-343 
 
1.5 
1.4 
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5. PROJECT FOSult AUDIT 
 
Five Projects were selected for the survey: Orbiter, External Tank, X-43 ,other Space Shuttle 
Program Elements, and Swift Spacecraft, located at JSC, MSFC, DRFC, and GSFC, 
respectively.  From each of the centers, an engineer was chosen to research the FOSult and 
waivers from the project.   The engineers acquired the answers to the following questions: 
 
1. What documents does the program use to define the requirements for structural 
FOSult? 
2. What is the requirement for structural FOSult? 
3. How is this factor defined? 
4. Does the program have any waivers or deviations from this requirement? 
5. Where are these deviations or waivers documented? 
6. Provide a list of the current waivers to structural FOSult. 
 
Table 5-1 summarizes the center, audited program/project, and the engineer responsible for the 
research and audit.   
 
Table 5-1.  Summary of Center, Project, and Audit Engineer 
Center Project Engineer 
JSC Orbiter J. Kramer-White 
MSFC External Tank J. Neeley 
JSC Other Shuttle Program Elements J. Kramer-White 
DRFC X-43 M. Kehoe 
GSFC Swift spacecraft A. Posey 
 
After the initial research was concluded, the engineers were asked to audit the programs FOSult 
and the waivers.  The audit involved an independent review of the program documentation and 
determination of reported FOSult and review of the initial and final waivers and deviations.   
 
The following sections describe the results of the research and the audit of each of the programs. 
 
5.1. Orbiter (J. Kramer-White, JSC) 
 
5.1.1. Document(s) for structural FOSult 
The Orbiter structural FOSult is defined in NSTS 07700, Volume X, Flight and 
Ground System Specification - Book 1, Requirements [7].  The FOSult 
requirements are detailed in Section 3.2.2.1.5, Structure. Section 3.2.2.1.5 is 
reproduced in Figure 5-1, a through c.   
 
5.1.2. Requirements for structural FOSult 
Ultimate FOSs are listed in NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 1, Table 3.2.2.1.5.2, 
Ultimate Factors of Safety, which is reproduced in Figure 5-2, a through c. There 
are no requirements on FOSyield.   
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In general the structure FOSult must be greater than or equal to 1.4, with more 
specific requirements for glass, pressurized compartments, pressure vessels, 
pressurized lines, and landing gear.  
 
5.1.3. FOSult definition 
See relevant definitions in NSTS 07700 Volume X, Book1, Section 3.2.2.1.5.1 
Definitions [7].  The FOSult is defined as:    
 
FOSult = Ultimate load/Limit Load 
 
5.1.4. Waivers or deviations from this requirement 
There are no structural FOSult waivers for the space shuttle orbiter.  This is 
because the program actively utilizes one of two methods, Modification or 
Performance Placarding, to avoid a FOSult lower than the requirements.  These 
methods are briefly discussed below.  
 
Modification: When increased systems performance from the NSTS is required, 
evaluation of the primary structure of the orbiter is conducted.  Affected areas are 
identified and analyzed in detail.  On occasion additional capability may be 
obtained through increased modeling fidelity and/or by decreasing the analytical 
conservatism.   If the performance increase is large, or the ascent trajectory 
changes are significant, major vehicle modifications may be required.  For 
example, certification of the orbiter for the 6.0 loads cycle required significant 
modification of the wing root structure; specifically, the addition of several 
doublers at the spar root to accommodate increased wing loads.  Therefore, 
vehicles could not fly the 6.0 loads trajectories until they had completed the 
modification program.  
  
Placarding: Placarding limits external environments to ensure the FOSult 
requirements are met.  Vehicle ascent performance placarding may be utilized 
until such time as the required modifications can be accomplished, or, if the 
performance penalty is not significant, placarding may be used in lieu of 
modifications.  For example, when a negative margin issue surfaced on 
Columbia's vertical tail in 1999, the ascent trajectory was modified to preclude 
reaching critical load.  This trajectory modification had a small, negative effect on 
launch probability and enabled additional flight data to be gathered.  The 
additional flight data allowed a better definition of the loads which ultimately led 
to removal of the placard. 
 
5.1.5. Waivers or deviations documentation 
There are no waivers or deviations for the orbiter project. 
 
5.1.6. List of current waivers to structural FOSult 
There are no waivers or deviations for the orbiter project. 
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Figure 5-1(a). NSTS 07700 Volume X Book 1 Section 3.2.2.1.5    Figure 5-1(b). NSTS 07700 Volume X Book 1 Section 3.2.2.1.5
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Figure 5-1(c).  NSTS 07700 Volume X Book 1 Section 3.2.2.1.5    Figure 5-2(a).  NSTS 07700 Volume X Book 1 Table 3.2.2.1.5.2
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Figure 5-2(b). NSTS 07700 Volume X Book 1 Table 3.2.2.1.5.2 Figure 5-2(c). NSTS 07700 Volume X Book 1 Table 3.2.2.1.5.2 
 17 
 
 
5.2.  External Tank (J. Neeley, MSFC) 
 
5.2.1. Documentation for structural FOSult 
The External Tank (ET) uses NSTS 07700, Volume X, Flight and Ground System 
Specification - Book 1, Requirements [7] and CPTO1MO9A External Tank 
Contract End Item Specification – Part 1 [12].    
 
5.2.2. Requirements for structural FOSult 
The ET structural FOSult requirements vary from 1.25 to 1.4 and depends on how 
well defined the loads are known.   The FOSult requirements from the External 
Tank Contract End Item Specification are shown in Figure 5-3, a through i.   
 
Note that this specification allows for “Deviations from these factors will be 
allowed in those instances where sufficient data on loads and strength variations 
are provided to establish structural integrity on a probability basis.” 
 
5.2.3. FOSult definition 
The ET FOSult is defined in NSTS 07700, Volume X, Table 3.2.2.1.5.2, as: 
 
For the ET the factor of safety for highly predictable quasi-static loads shall be equal to 
or greater than 1.25. Examples of such loads are steady thrust, inertial loads from steady 
acceleration, and weight. Thus the combined factor of safety requirement for ET 
structure subjected to quasi-static and not quasi-static loads is determined by: 
 
 (% QUASI-STATIC)              (% NOT QUASI-STATIC) 
FOSult = ------------------------X (1.25) +   -------------------------------X (1.4) 
  100%            100% 
 
For ascent, the combined factor of safety shall be limited to a quasi-static load range of 
75% to 100%. For quasi-static loads less than 75%, the factor of safety shall be 1.4. 
Therefore, the combined factor of safety can range from 1.25 to 1.29 for quasi-static 
loads ranging from 100% to 75% and is 1.4 for quasi-static loads ranging from 74% to 
0. The factor of safety requirement may be determined individually for each hardware 
component. 
  
Note this definition deviates from the standard definition used in the aerospace industry 
and NASA–STD-5001. 
 
5.2.4. Waiver or deviations from this requirement 
There are no current waivers for flight structural FOSult.  There is one retired 
flight FOSult waiver, waiver # 662.  This waiver covered ET stainless steel tubing, 
helium inject tubing, intertank purge lines, and nose cone purge lines.  The waiver 
was only applicable for ET 66 and ET-71 through ET-75 and is therefore retired.  
Waiver #662 is shown in Figure 5-4, a through d.   
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Although ET does not have any current waivers, there are many components on 
the ET that have a FOSult less than the 1.4 aerospace standard.  The ET project 
requirements allow a FOSult as low as 1.25 (reference Figure 5-3†) if the load is 
“well defined”.  Components with a FOSult less than 1.4 are listed in Table 5-2.  
 
Table 5-2.  ET Components with FOSult Requirements less than 1.4 
Component FOSult Requirement 
Intertank Thrust Panel 1.27 to 1.4 depending on Mach number 
LO2 Tank 1.29 to 1.4 depending on Mach number 
Aft SRB Attach Fitting1 1.34  
Note: 
1) The FOSult relaxation was only applicable to pre-Super Light Weight Tanks 
(SLWT).  The current SLWT FOSult requirement is 1.4.  
 
Additionally, there is one waiver and one deviation for an item of ET Ground 
Support Equipment, the Ground Umbilical Carrier Assembly. 
 
5.2.5. Waivers or deviations documentation 
NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 4, Flight and Ground System Specification, Active 
Deviations/Waivers [7], and NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 6, Flight and Ground 
System Specification, Retired Deviations/Waivers [7].   
 
5.2.6. List of current waivers to structural FOSult 
None.  However, the FOSult requirements for numerous components are less than 
the aerospace standard of 1.4.  Refer to Table 5-2 for a list of components that 
have a FOSult less than 1.4. 
                                                 
† In Figure 5.3(d), the equivalent FOS is defined as 
Equivalent FOS = [ ( % Quasistatic loads ) * 1.25 + ( % Not quasistatic loads ) * 1.4 ] / (Total limit loads). 
This definition is incorrect.  The correct definition is 
Equivalent FOS = [ ( % Quasistatic loads ) * 1.25 + ( % Not quasistatic loads ) * 1.4 ] / 100. 
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Figure 5-3(a). ET FOSult Requirements         Figure 5-3(b). ET FOSult Requirements 
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Figure 5-3(c). ET FOSult Requirements         Figure 5-3(d). ET FOSult Requirements 
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Figure 5-3(e). ET FOSult Requirements         Figure 5-3(f). ET FOSult Requirements 
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Figure 5-3(g). ET FOSult Requirements         Figure 5-3(h). ET FOSult Requirements 
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Figure 5-3(i). ET FOSult Requirements 
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              Figure 5-4(a). ET FOSult Retired Waiver 662                       Figure 5-4(b). ET FOSult Retired Waiver 662 
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                    Figure 5-4(c). ET FOSult Retired Waiver 662                       Figure 5-4(d). ET FOSult Retired Waiver 662 
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5.3. Other Space Shuttle Program Elements (J. Kramer-White, JSC) 
This section describes details for the Space Shuttle Program elements other than the 
orbiter and the ET discussed previously.  These elements include the SRB, SRM, and the 
SSME. 
 
5.3.1. Document(s) for structural FOSult 
The structural FOSult for all space shuttle systems are defined in NSTS 07700 
Volume X, Flight and Ground System Specification - Book 1, Requirements [7].  
The FOSult requirements are detailed in Section 3.2.2.1.5, Structure. Section 
3.2.1.5 is reproduced and provided in Figure 5-1, a through c.   
 
5.3.2. Requirements for structural FOSult 
Ultimate FOSs are listed in NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 1, Table 3.2.2.1.5.2, 
Ultimate Factors of Safety, which is reproduced and provided in Figure 5-2, a 
through c. There are no requirements on Yield FOS.   
 
Generally, the structure FOSult requirement is greater than or equal to 1.4, with 
more specific requirements for glass, pressurized compartments, pressure vessels 
and pressurized lines, landing gear and exceptions for some specific SRB 
elements (i.e., SRB after separation > 1.25).  
 
Note that if a requirement has been changed to allow an exception, then it is NOT 
considered a waiver or deviation. Therefore, a program can cite an exception 
because general/original requirements are not met.  Such situations are cited in 
notes (F) through (M) of Table 3.2.2.1.5.2, which is reproduced and provided in 
Figure 5-2, a through c. 
 
5.3.3. FOSult definition 
See relevant definitions in NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 1, Section 3.2.2.1.5.1, 
Definitions [7], but specifically, FOSult is defined as: 
 
         FOSult = Ultimate load/Limit load    
  
5.3.4. Waivers or deviations from this requirement 
There are a total of 5 waivers: Waivers #387, 448, 449, 512 and 692.   
 
Note: Since the time of this audit, the Shuttle Program has invested 
considerable effort to eliminate FOS waivers as part of the return-to-
flight activity.  Recently, these efforts resulted in the retirement of 
waivers #387, 448, and 449. 
 
5.3.5. Waivers or deviations documentation 
 NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 4, Flight and Ground System Specification, 
Active Deviations/Waivers [7], and NSTS 07700, Volume X, Book 6, Flight and 
Ground System Specification, Retired Deviations/Waivers [7].   
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5.3.6. List of current waivers to structural FOSult 
Appendix B of this paper lists the current waivers for space shuttle elements. 
 
 
5.4. X-43 (M. Kehoe, DRFC) 
 
5.4.1. Documentation for structural FOSult 
The HYPER-X structural FOS requirements are documented in Hyper-X 
document HX-280 Rev G Hyper-X, Flight System Performance Requirements 
[13]. 
 
Hyper-X Launch Vehicle (HXLV) delivers the Hyper-X Research Vehicle 
(HXRV) and adapter to its flight separation point.  After that point the HXRV will 
fire its scramjet propulsion system while traveling at hypersonic speeds.  Thus the 
two vehicles have vastly different FOS. 
 
5.4.2. Requirements for structural FOS 
Refer to Tables 5-3 and 5-4. 
 
Table 5-3.  HXLV Requirements for Boost and Free-Flight 
Factors of Safety 
Yield 1.1 Mechanical loads  
 Ultimate 1.5 
Yield 1.0 Thermal loads *,** 
Ultimate 1.0 
* Refer to HXGFI-01 Section H7010-M7-01-ST for additional requirements on 
uncertainty factors for thermal analysis. 
** The FOS defined for thermal loads shall be applied to internal stresses within a 
component. Loads that cross a mechanical joint and the loads within that joint shall use as 
a minimum the FOS for mechanical loads. 
 
Table 5-4.  HXRV Requirements for Captive Carry Flight 
Factors of Safety 
Metallic Structures 2.25 Mechanical loads  
 Non-metallic Structures 3.0 
 
 
5.4.3. FOSult definition 
The project uses the following definition: 
 
FOSult = Ultimate Load/Limit Load 
 
5.4.4. Waiver or deviations from this requirement 
 There are no waivers or deviations for the X-43 project. 
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5.4.5.  Waivers or deviations documentation  
There are no waivers for structural FOSult.  Normally deviation and waiver 
documentation is managed by the Project led by the Configuration Control Board 
(CCB).  The CCB consists of representatives from the project, engineering, 
quality assurance, safety, and science (if applicable).   The CCB reviews the 
waiver and waiver rationale and approves or rejects the waiver. 
 
5.4.6. List of current waivers to structural FOSult 
There are no waivers or deviations for the X-43 project. 
 
5.5. Swift Spacecraft (A. Posey, GSFC) 
The Swift program is a GSFC program managed out of the Explores Program Office 
(Code 410). There are three scientific instruments on the Observatory. Goddard is 
building one of the instruments (BAT - Burst Alert Telescope) in-house while the two 
other instruments are being provided by Penn State University [Ultra-Violet Optical 
Telescope (UVOT) and X-ray Telescope (XRT)] in partnership with donated hardware 
being provided by Mullard Space Science Laboratory and the University of Leicester in 
the (UK), and the Osservatorio Astronomico di Brera (Italy). The spacecraft is being 
procured through the Goddard Rapid Spacecraft Development Office (RSDO) with 
Spectrum-Astro being responsible for spacecraft bus and system integration. 
 
5.5.1. Documentation for structural FOSult 
For the Instruments and Optical bench, the minimum FOSs are defined in the 
Swift Instrument Requirement Document (IRD), Section 3.8. The contract 
specification for the Spectrum-Astro bus did not specify minimum FOSs.  The 
minimum FOSs are specified in Spectrum-Astro’s own internal design document 
(1143-EW-M22361). 
 
5.5.2. Requirement for structural FOSult 
The FOS requirements are tracked in the project’s Requirement Verification 
Matrix (RVM) and verified at component delivery when the End Item Data 
Package (EIDP) is submitted and reviewed. The RVM points to the particular 
stress analysis or applicable report.  
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5.5.3. FOSult Definition 
Table 5-5 details the various FOSs for the different Swift Observatory elements. 
  
Table 5-5. FOS for Swift Observatory Elements 
Swift Observatory 
Element 
FOSyield FOSult FOSyield1 FOSult1 
BAT (GSFC H/W) 1.25 1.4 1.6 2.0 
UVOT 1.25 1.4 1.6 2.0 
XRT 1.25 1.4 1.6 2.0 
OPTICAL BENCH 
(GSFC H/W) 
1.25 1.4 1.6 2.0 
S/C BUS STRUCTURE 
(SPECTRUM-ASTRO) 
1.25 1.4 1.6 2.0 
MGSE3 3.0 5.0   
1These FOSs are for hardware elements that were not qualified during the strength test program and were 
therefore qualified through analysis only.  
2 The instrument was “build to print” that was qualified by similarity from a previous program. 
3Mechanical Ground Support Equipment 
 
 
5.5.4. Waivers or deviations from this requirement 
There are no structural FOSult waivers. 
 
5.5.5. Waiver or deviations documentation 
Waivers are documented through a Project led by the CCB.  The CCB consists of 
representatives from the project, engineering, quality assurance, safety, and 
science (if applicable).   The CCB reviews the waiver and waiver rationale and 
approves or rejects the waiver.    
 
5.5.6. List of current waivers to structural FOSult 
There are no structural FOSult waivers. 
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5.6. Audit Summary 
Table 5-6 provides a summary of the Project Audited, the Structural Ultimate FOSult used 
and the number of deviations to the required FOSult. 
 
 
Table 5-6. Summary FOSult and Waivers for all Programs Reviewed 
Program/Project Required FOSult Current Waivers 
Orbiter 1.4 None 
ET 1.25 to 1.4 None 
SRB, SRM, SSME 1.4 2SRB1, 2 SRM1, 1ET (retired) 
X-43 1.5 None 
Swift Spacecraft 1.4 None 
Note 1) Since the time of the original audit both SRB waivers and 1 SRM 
waiver above have been retired. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The audit discovered that all of the projects used NASA-STD-5001 for the overall structure 
FOSult requirements but ultimately customized these requirement(s) into their own internal 
requirements document.  In addition to the aerospace FOSult requirement of 1.4, the aeronautical 
project reviewed used the higher FAA requirement of structural FOSult ≥1.5. 
 
Most of the projects surveyed met the NASA-STD-5001 structural FOSult value of 1.4.  The 
exception was the Space Shuttle Program’s non-orbiter projects.  There were five active waivers 
for structural FOSult.  (Since the time of the original audit the Space Shuttle Program has 
undertaken considerable effort to eliminate FOSult waivers as part of the return-to-flight activity.  
This has resulted in retirement of three of the five waivers discussed previously.)  In addition to 
the waivers there were several examples of FOSult requirement relaxation below the 1.4 standard.  
When the requirement was relaxed, there was no need for a waiver.   
 
The justification for a relaxed or waived structural FOSult varied, but in all cases was limited at 
best.  An often cited justification was the “loads were well known”.  This was a necessary 
condition but insufficient as the “loads were well known” was a requisite for originally reducing 
the FOSult from 1.5 to 1.4 and cannot be used again to further reduce the FOSult below 1.4.   An 
uncertainty factor, applied to analysis results, accounts for the load knowledge fidelity.  As the 
loads become well known, the uncertainty factor reduces to unity (reference NASA-STD-5002 
“Load Analysis of Spacecraft”, paragraph 4.2.4.2 [14]).  Load knowledge fidelity should not 
impact the value of the FOSult (reference NASA-STD-5001, paragraph 1.2).  Since the FOSult 
requirement is derived from historical data and not from fundamental physics, one cannot simply 
extrapolate outside of the known database when no valid, statistically significant, data exists.  To 
justify the waiver in the absence of a physics/mathematical model, only the generation of a 
statistically significant data set can be used, or unknowns significantly reduced (i.e., test verified 
model, measured loads, etc.).  It is of concern that engineering judgment may often be used that 
has neither mathematical basis nor statistically significant test data to support a technically sound 
determination. 
 
Based on the work performed during the course of this action item, five recommendations are 
presented below. 
 
6.1. FOSult when testing is not available 
Although NASA-STD-5001, Section 4.1.2.3, provides general information on test versus 
no-test options, it does not provide specific FOSult guidance for no-test hardware.  GSFC 
General Environmental Verification Specification (GEVS) [6] provides specific guidance 
on no-test FOSult (2.0 for Yield and 2.6 for Ultimate) and some Projects (Swift 
spacecraft) use a higher FOSult when qualification is performed by analysis only.  Other 
Centers do not have such guidelines and, therefore, no single number, if any, is used for 
no-test hardware. Whenever possible, higher FOSult values are recommended when 
qualification is performed using analysis only.  It is recommended to update NASA-STD-
5001 to include specific guidance and suggested FOSult value required for no-test 
hardware.   
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6.2. Requirement Relaxation 
In rare instances it was observed that to maintain a positive MOSult, the standard FOSult 
requirement was relaxed instead of issuing a waiver.  With this practice one loses 
visibility into the rationale behind the modification.  Additionally, NASA loses the ability 
to look at waivers across the agency to gather statistical evidence on how often the 
standard FOSult is reduced.   
It is recognized that unique situations may exist where the FOSult requirements, based on 
project maturity, can be revised from the 1.4 value with negligible increased risk.  The 
specific case involves the single use Shuttle External Tank (ET) Project where a 
comprehensive operational database of flight experience, manufacturing process 
characterization, analytical modeling, and test validation justified the change of the 
FOSult from 1.4 to 1.25 for static pressure loads.  However, the FOSult requirement 
change should have been documented by the generation of a deviation and not a 
contractual requirements relaxation.  This allows system visibility on the rationale used to 
justify the alteration and appreciation of any potential synergistic affects. 
It is recommended that Projects not relax requirements to meet hardware performance, 
but rather utilize the waiver and deviation processes when appropriate. 
 
6.3. FOSult Waivers Not a Precedent  
Waivers should be considered a one time exception.  For reusable (i.e., Space Shuttle 
Program elements) or flights of recurring hardware (i.e. off the shelf spacecraft bus) a 
waiver should not be a precedent to continue flying with a  deficiency, but an indication 
that corrective action must be taken. 
 
6.4. Maintaining FOS Over the Life of a Program 
Structural strength or load carrying capability is often only computed one time during the 
life of the hardware.  While this may be appropriate for elements that are one time use, or 
have only a very limited life, this is not an appropriate approach for the certification of an 
element that will be utilized for many years.  Over the life of a system, reduction of the 
original Allowable Ultimate Load may occur for several reasons: 
 
• Degradation of materials or coatings (e.g.corrosion, atomic oxygen, etc.) 
• Wear and Tear/Operationally induced damage 
• Maintenance induced damage 
 
Reduction of the Allowable Ultimate Load results in a corresponding reduction of 
MOSult.  To maintain a positive MOSult, the FOSult is often reduced. 
 
NASA-STD-5001 should be modified to include requirements for periodic re-
certification of hardware capability throughout a program’s life.  While programs tend to 
recognize the impact of changing missions and therefore loads as a valid reason for re-
computing the MOS and potentially FOS, this revalidation process should also include 
relevant information from hardware inspection, problem reports and material review 
board (MRB) actions as it relates to structural integrity. 
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6.5. Probabilistic Approaches 
The FOSult approach that is traditionally used can be described as illustrated in Figure 6-
1.  The load that is calculated on the structural component is multiplied by the FOSult and 
the strength or equivalent material property (shown as resistance in this figure) is 
multiplied by a number called the knock-down factor (usually to account for presence of 
stress raisers such as holes, defects, etc., hot-wet conditions, etc.).  The FOSult are usually 
greater than unity while knock-down factors are less than unity.  The difference between 
the two dashed bars shown in the figure is the MOS.  This traditional approach has been 
proven to be useful during the past five to six decades for aerospace components. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1. Traditional Method based on FOSult 
 
Figure 6-2 illustrates an alternative to the FOSult approach called the probabilistic 
approach or reliability-based design approach.  Here both the load and the strength are 
characterized by probability density functions.  These distributions are due to 
uncertainties in the loads applied and to the strengths of material of the structural 
component. The overlap region (where the load exceeds the strength) indicates the 
probability of failure.  
 
Figure 6-2. Reliability-based Design Methodology 
 
The traditional design procedures, however, have several shortcomings. First in the 
traditional approach, FOSult value was determined empirically and not based on any 
physics or mathematics.  Second, measures of reliability are not available from the design 
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process.  Consequently, it is not possible to determine the relative importance of various 
design options on the reliability of the component.  Third, with no measure of reliability, 
it is unlikely that the reliability and performance will be consistent throughout the 
vehicle.  This situation can lead to excess weight with no corresponding improvement in 
overall reliability. 
 
An approach that has the potential to yield the degree of reliability needed in each 
component of a system will be beneficial to aerospace structures and structural 
components.  Probabilistic approaches hold excellent promise in these directions [15, 16].  
Therefore, it is recommended that NASA perform further research in these areas. 
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Appendix A 
 
Acronyms & Definitions 
 
Acronyms 
 
BAT  Burst Alert Telescope 
BSM   Booster Separation Motor 
CAIB  Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CCB  Configuration Control Board 
CLA   Coupled Loads Analysis 
CR  Change Request 
DFRC  Dryden Flight Research Center 
DoD   Department of Defense 
EIDP   End Item Data Package 
ELV   Expendable Launch Vehicle 
EMU  Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
ET   External Tank 
ETA  External Tank Attach  
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FOS  Factor of Safety 
FOSult   Ultimate Factor of Safety 
FOSyield Yield Factor of Safety 
GEVS   General Environmental Verification Specification 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center 
HXLV  Hyper-X Launch Vehicle 
HXRV  Hyper-X Research Vehicle 
IRD   Instrument Requirement Document (Swift) 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LO2  Liquid Oxygen 
MDP  Maximum Design Pressure 
MGSE  Mechanical Ground Support Equipment 
MOS  Margin of Safety 
MSFC  Marshall Space Flight Center 
MUF   Model Uncertainty Factor 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NSTS  National Space Transportation System 
PA   Probabilistic Approaches  
PRCB   Program Requirements Control Board 
RSDO   Rapid Spacecraft Development Office 
RVM   Requirement Verification Matrix 
SRB   Solid Rocket Booster 
SRM   Solid Rocket Motor 
SSME   Space Shuttle Main Engine 
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UVOT  Ultra-Violet Optical Telescope 
XRT  X-ray Telescope 
 
Definitions  
 
Acceptance Test   
A test performed on each article of the flight hardware to verify workmanship, material quality, 
and structural integrity of the design.  In the protoflight structural verification approach, 
acceptance, proof, and protoflight tests are synonymous. 
 
Creep   
Time-dependent permanent deformation under sustained load and environmental conditions. 
 
Detrimental yielding 
Yielding that adversely affects the fit, form, function, or integrity of the structure. 
 
Factors Of Safety (Safety Factors) 
Multiplying factors to be applied to limit loads or stresses for purposes of analytical assessment 
(design factors) or test verification (test factors) of design adequacy in strength or stability. 
 
Failure 
Rupture, collapse, excessive deformation, or any other phenomenon resulting in the inability of a 
structure to sustain specified loads, pressures, and environments, or to function as designed. 
 
Fatigue 
The cumulative irreversible damage incurred in materials caused by cyclic application of stresses 
and environments resulting in degradation of load carrying capability. 
 
Limit Load 
The maximum anticipated load, or combination of loads, which a structure may experience 
during its service life under all expected conditions of operation or use. 
 
Maximum Design Pressure (MDP)   
The highest possible operating pressure considering maximum temperature, maximum relief 
pressure, maximum regulator pressure, and, where applicable, transient pressure excursions.  
MDP for Space Shuttle payloads is a two-failure tolerant pressure, i.e., will accommodate any 
combination of two credible failures that will affect pressure during association with the Space 
Shuttle.  MDP also accommodates the maximum temperature to be experienced in the event of 
an abort to a site without cooling facilities. 
 
Pressure Vessel   
A container designed primarily for storing pressurized gases or liquids and (1) contains stored 
energy of 14,240 foot-pounds (19,309 Joules) or greater, based on adiabatic expansion of a 
perfect gas; or (2) experiences a limit pressure greater than 100 pounds per square inch absolute 
(psia) (689.5 kiloPascal [kPa] absolute); or (3) contains a pressurized fluid in excess of 15 psia 
(103.4 kPa absolute), which will create a safety hazard if released. 
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Pressurized Component   
A line, fitting, valve, or other part designed to contain pressure and that (1) is not made of glass, 
or (2) is not a pressure vessel, or (3) is not a propellant tank, or (4) is not a solid rocket motor 
case. 
 
Proof Test 
A test performed on the flight hardware to verify workmanship, material quality, and structural 
integrity of the design.  In the protoflight structural verification approach, proof, acceptance, and 
protoflight tests are synonymous. 
 
Proof Test Factor 
A multiplying factor to be applied to the limit load or MDP to define the proof test load or 
pressure. 
 
Protoflight Test 
A test performed on the flight hardware to verify workmanship, material quality, and structural 
integrity of the design.  In the protoflight structural verification approach, protoflight, 
acceptance, and proof tests are synonymous. 
 
Prototype Test 
A test performed on a separate flight-like structural test article to verify structural integrity of the 
design.  Prototype tests and qualification tests are synonymous. 
 
Qualification Test 
A test performed on a separate flight-like structural article of each type to verify structural 
integrity of the design.  Qualification and prototype tests are synonymous. 
 
Qualification Test Factor 
A multiplying factor to be applied to the limit load or MDP to define the qualification test load or 
pressure. 
 
Safety Critical  
A classification for structures, components, procedures, etc., whose failure to perform as 
designed or produce the intended results would pose a threat of serious personal injury or loss of 
life. 
 
Service Life  
All significant loading cycles or events during the period beginning with manufacture of a 
component and ending with completion of its specified use.  Testing, transportation, lift-off, 
ascent, on-orbit operations, descent, landing and post-landing events shall be considered. 
 
Service Life Factor (Life Factor) 
A multiplying factor to be applied to the maximum expected number of load cycles in the service 
life to determine the design adequacy in fatigue or fracture. 
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Ultimate Design Load 
The product of the ultimate factor of safety and the limit load.  Also referred to as Ultimate Load 
and Design Ultimate Load. 
 
Ultimate Strength 
The maximum load or stress that a structure or material can withstand without incurring failure. 
 
Yield Design Load 
The product of the yield factor of safety and the limit load. 
 
Yield Strength 
The maximum load or stress that a structure or material can withstand without incurring 
detrimental yielding. 
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Appendix B 
 
Summary of Waivers for Space Shuttle Elements (SRB, SRM, SSME) 
  
 
Waiver process used by the Space Shuttle Program: 
 
"When it is considered to be in the best interest by the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) 
element/project managers to change, waive or deviate from these requirements, an SSP Change 
Request (CR) shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Program Requirements Control Board 
(PRCB). The CR must include a complete description of the change, waiver or deviation and the 
rationale to justify its consideration. All such requests will be processed in accordance with 
NSTS 07700, Volume IV - Book 1 and dispositioned by the Manager, Space Shuttle Program, on 
a Space Shuttle PRCB Directive (PRCBD)." 
 
Table B.1 presents waiver numbers 387, 448, 449, 512, 662, and 692.  Note that the retired 
waivers are included in this table.
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Table B.1.  List of Space Shuttle Element Structural FOS Waivers 
Num Requirement Element Waiver or 
Deviation 
Rational Effectivity Authority Date 
387 
Retired 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.5 Structure. The Shuttle Vehicle 
structure, including pressure vessels and mechanical 
systems, shall have adequate strength and stiffness, at the 
design temperature, to withstand limit loads and pressures 
without loss of operational capability for the life of the 
vehicle and to withstand ultimate loads and pressures at 
design temperature without failure.  The structure shall not 
be designed to withstand loads, pressures or temperatures 
arising from malfunctions that prevent a successful abort.  
Major structural elements shall not be designed by nonflight 
conditions, i.e., conditions other than prelaunch (vehicle 
mating) through landing except for SRB water recovery. 
 
Retired (Reference Space Shuttle PRCBD, S094174L, 
dated 8/10/04) 
SRB Waiver:  The 
above 
requirement is 
waived for system 
tunnel parts with 
negative margins 
which occur 
during 
splashdown. 
N/A STS-26 
thru STS-
999 
Level II 
PRCBD 
S94174A 
9/10/1988 
448 
Retired 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.5 Structure. The Shuttle Vehicle 
structure, including pressure vessels and mechanical 
systems, shall have adequate strength and stiffness, at the 
design temperature, to withstand limit loads and pressures 
without loss of operational capability for the life of the 
vehicle and to withstand ultimate loads and pressures at 
design temperature without failure.  The structure shall not 
be designed to withstand loads, pressures or temperatures 
arising from malfunctions that prevent a successful abort.  
Major structural elements shall not be designed by nonflight 
conditions, i.e., conditions other than prelaunch (vehicle 
mating) through landing except for SRB water recovery. 
 
Retired (Reference Space Shuttle PRCBD S094174L, dated 
8/10/04) 
SRM Waiver: APU 
isolation mounts 
(see part number 
below) which 
have a negative 
margin of safety 
at water impact. 
P/N 10201-0062-
801(M2), S/N's 
V7J003, V9D002, 
V9D007, V9D012; 
P/N 10201-0061-
801 (M3), 
V9D008, V9D010, 
V9D011, V8E002 
N/A STS-26 & 
subs 
Level II 
PRCBD 
S94554 
9/21/1988 
449 
Retired 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.5 Structure. The Shuttle Vehicle 
structure, including pressure vessels and mechanical 
systems, shall have adequate strength and stiffness, at the 
design temperature, to withstand limit loads and pressures 
without loss of operational capability for the life of the 
vehicle and to withstand ultimate loads and pressures at 
design temperature without failure.  The structure shall not 
be designed to withstand loads, pressures or temperatures 
arising from malfunctions that prevent a successful abort.  
Major structural elements shall not be designed by nonflight 
conditions, i.e., conditions other than prelaunch (vehicle 
mating) through landing except for SRB water recovery. 
 
Retired (Reference Space Shuttle PRCBD S094174L, dated 
8/10/04) 
SRB Waiver: forward 
skirt access door 
fasteners with 
negative margins 
which occur 
during 
splashdown 
N/A STS-26 & 
subs 
  
Level II 
PRCBD 
S94741A 
9/21/1988 
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Table B.1.  List of Space Shuttle Element Structural FOS Waivers 
Num Requirement Element Waiver or 
Deviation 
Rational Effectivity Authority Date 
512 
Open 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.8 Fracture Control. In addition to the 
ultimate factors of safety presented in Paragraph 
3.2.2.1.5.2, designs for primary structure, windows, glass 
components of other subsystems, and tanks shall consider 
the presence of sharp cracks, crack-like flaws, or other 
stress concentrations in determining the life of the structure 
for sustained loads and cyclic loads coupled with 
environmental effects. Parts (other than SSME) determined 
to be fracture critical shall be controlled in design, 
fabrication, test, and operation by a formal, NASA-approved 
fracture control plan as specified in SE-R-0006, JSC 
Requirements For Materials And Processes. SSME parts 
determined to be fracture critical shall be subjected to 
fracture mechanics analysis as specified in RSS-8589. 
Where analysis does not demonstrate that the detectable 
flaw size will not grow to critical size during the service life, a 
risk assessment will be made to determine the acceptability 
of the part for flight and the conditions for this use. 
 
SE-R-0006, Paragraph 2.4.2, Fracture Control Plan. Quality 
Assurance. The quality assurance system applied to 
fracture-critical parts will verify that materials and parts 
conform to engineering requirements. Specifically, the 
capability of Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques to 
reliably detect initial flaws defined by engineering will be 
verified based on applicable production experience or by 
laboratory demonstration with realistic flaws and production 
or inservice inspection conditions. 
EMU "Waiver:  Allows 
exemption from 
Nondestructive 
Evaluation 
(NDE) of the 
liners for PLSS 
composite 
pressure vessels 
(SV778895)." 
N/A STS-26 & 
sub-
sequent 
  
Level II 
PRCBD 
S41427B 
2/2/1989 
662 
Retired 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.5.2 Ultimate Factors of Safety. The 
ultimate factors of safety given in Table 3.2.2.1.5.2 shall be 
used for the Shuttle Vehicle structure. 
 
Retired per SSP DOC-422, dated 3/31/99. (Reference 
Space Shuttle PRCBD S082908A, dated 11/10/95). See 
Book 6. 
ET Waiver:  3/8 inch 
external tank 
stainless steel 
tubing to allow an 
ultimate factor of 
safety of 1.75 for 
helium inject 
tubing, 1.35 for 
intertank purge, 
and 1.37 for the 
nose cone purge 
lines 
 ET-74 Space 
Shuttle 
PRCBDs 
S082908A; 
S082908AR
1 
11/10/1995; 
11/20/95 
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Table B.1.  List of Space Shuttle Element Structural FOS Waivers 
Num Requirement Element Waiver or 
Deviation 
Rational Effectivity Authority Date 
692 
Open 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.6 Ultimate Combined Loads. The 
mechanical external, thermally induced, and internal 
pressure loads shall be combined in a rational manner 
according to the equation given below to determine the 
design loads. Any other loads induced in the structure, e.g., 
during manufacturing, shall be combined in a rational 
manner. In no case shall the ratio of the allowable load to 
the combined limit loads be less than the factor in 
Paragraph 3.2.2.1.5.2. 
SRM Waiver: RSRM 
nozzle adhesive 
bondlines. Nozzle 
bondline analysis 
for EA946 and 
EA913NA 
adhesives does 
not explicitly 
include 
manufacturing 
residual stresses, 
accommodation is 
by increased 
safety factor 
Test and analysis support conclusion that the 
nozzle will remain bonded prelaunch and 
through flight. Process and materials 
improvements have increased A-basis 
properties strength from 1500 psi to 2390 psi. 
Generally nozzle adhesive bonds are 
structurally fail-safe: phenolic rings 
mechanically interlocked and loaded in 
compression during motor operation. Primary 
structure (nozzle metal housings) meets 1.4 SF 
without including support of the adhesive bonds 
and phenolics. Multiple low probability events 
necessary to thermally fail nozzle due to gas 
flow between phenolics and housing. All 260 
nozzles in SRM and RSRM program have met 
design requirement of thermally protecting 
housings. Residual stresses have been 
significantly reduced and bond line robustness 
increased through process control 
improvements. STS-109 (RSRM-83) and 
subsequent motor effectivities identified for this 
waiver are safe to fly 
STS-107, 
STS-109 
thru STS-
118  
Space 
Shuttle 
PRCBDs 
S071796; 
S071796R1
  
2/22/2002; 
10/9/2003 
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Table C-1.  Historical design factors for NASA space vehicles. (Revised from Table 3.2 in original report.) 
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General Structure  Yield  1.1 * 1.1 * 1.1 * 1.0    † 1.1  -@ 1.1  1.1 1.1 1.1  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.15  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.15  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  
Ultimate 1.5  1.36  1.5  1.4  1.5 ‡ 1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5 1.4 1.4  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.36  1.5  1.25  1.25  1.25  1.25  1.5  1.25  1.5  1.25  1.25  
Tanks-Liquid Propellant and 
Other Fluids-Cryogenics  Yield 1.33  - - 1  1.5  1.1     1.1 1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1             1.0  
Proof 1.33  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.05     1.1 1.05  1.1  1.1  1.05  1.5    1.05  1.67  1.1       1.0  
Ultimate 1.5  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.33 x 1.5 1.4     1.4 1.4  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.33 x 1.5   1.33  2.22  1.25    1.25    1.25   
Propellant Lines  Yield  - - - - - -         1             
Proof  - - - - - -         1.5        1.5      
Ultimate  - - - - - -         1.88   1.65      2.5      
Vessels (High Pres Bottle) Vent 
Lines Plumbing, etc.  Yield 1.33  1.0  1.0  1.0  - 1.1     1.1 1.15  1.15  1.33  1.1   1.0  1.5       1.0   2.25   
Proof 1.33  1.67  1.7  1.5  - 1.1     1.1 1.05  1.05  1.33  1.05   1.67  2.0  1.33      1.67  1.66  2.0   
Ultimate 1.5  2.22  2.2  2.0  - 4.0     4.0 1.4  1.4  2.0  1.4   2.22   1.5      2.0  2.0  4.0   
Pressurized Structure-Cabins, 
Airlocks, Ducts, etc.  Yield 1.0  1.0  1.3  1.0  1.0  - - 1.65  1.7      1.1  1.0            
Proof NA  1.33  - 1.33  1.2  - 1.1  1.5  1.5       1.36            
Ultimate 1.5  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.5  - 1.5  2.0  2.0      1.4  2.0            
Hydraulic and Pneumatic Sys. 
(Incl. Lines, Fitting, Tubing)  Yield  - 1.0  1.0  1.0   1.1     1.1     1.0  1.0  2.0      1.5    2.25  2.0  
Proof 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0     2.0 2.0     2.0  2.0  2.0  2.5  2.0  1.5   1.5    2.0  2.0  
Ultimate 4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0     4.0 4.0     4.0  4.0  4.0  5.0  4.0  3.0   2.5    4.0  4.0  
Nonflight: Dangerous To 
Personnel  Yield    1.0            1.0    1.5        1.6   
Ultimate    1.5            1.5    4.0        2.0   
Nonflight: Not Dangerous To 
Personnel  Yield    1.0            1.0    1.0  1.15   1.15      1.0  
Ultimate    1.25            1.25    1.33  1.50   1.50      1.25  
Pneumatic and Hydraulic System 
Components Heat Exchangers 
(Including Cold Panels). Quick 
Disconnect, Blowers, Valves, 
Pressure Switches, Regulators  
Yield  1.0  1.0  1.0             1.0           1.0  
Proof 1.33  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5            1.5    1.5        1.5  
Ultimate 1.5  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.5            2.5    2.5        2.5  
New values being quoted by Clarence (Tom) Modelin (retired JSC) 
* 1.0 
† 1.1 
‡ 1.4 
@ 1.1 on external tank and solid rocket boosters 
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